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TOWARD A SATISFACTORY FIXTURE DEFINITION
FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Section 9-313, the primary fixture-security provision of the Uni-
form Commercial Code,' sets forth the priorities between a party with
a security interest in a fixture and a person having an interest in the
real estate to which the fixture is attached. The section is inadequate2
because it fails to define the term "fixture;" instead, it provides that
"[t]he law of this state other than this Act determines whether and
when... goods become fixtures."3
The UCC creates three classes of goods used in association with
real estate. (1) Goods that are used upon the realty but in which no
purchaser or encumbrancer of the real estate obtains any interest. Such
goods are personalty or chattels, and security interests in them are
governed by sections of Article 9 other than section 9-313. 4 (2) Goods
that are used in such close connection with the real estate as to become
"incorporated into" it. Such goods are considered to be real estate, and
security interests in them are unavailable under the UCC. (3) Goods
that are "affixed" to the real estate so as to become "fixtures," and thus
a part of the realty, but which can be severed from the realty and re-
turned to the status of chattels if the proper "priority" has been ob-
tained;5 security interests in them can be maintained under section
9-313. The Code does not clearly separate these categories. It draws
only a rough line between fixtures and real estate, providing that goods
that have become realty are "incorporated into a structure in the man-
ner of lumber, bricks, . . . metalwork and the like . . . ." The more
1 For the text of § 9-313 see Appendix A infra. All citations to the Uniform Com-
mercial Code [hereinafter cited as UCC or Code] are to the 1966 Offial Version.
2 The list of those who have criticized § 9-313 includes some of its draftsmen. Coogan,
Fixtures-Uniformity in Words or in Fact?, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1186 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Coogan]; Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 75 HAZv. L. Rxv. 1319 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 75 HAxvAR]; Gilmore, The Pur-
chase Money Priority, 76 HAnv. L. Ray. 1383 (1963); Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 44 (1964). See also Shanker, An Integrated Financing
System for Purchase Money Collateral: A Proposed Solution to the Fixture Problem Under
Section 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 YAM Lj. 788 (1964).
The Article 9 Review Committee has proposed a revision of the section. Rav mw
CoMMIrrrE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Fixtures (Preliminary
Draft No. 1, November 20, 1968). For its text see Appendix B infra.
3 UCC § 9-313(1).
4 E.g., UCC §§ 9-301, 9-312.
5 See Coogan at 1190.
a UCC § 9-313(1).
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critical line, that between fixtures and chattels, is to be drawn by "[t]he
law of this state other than this Act."
Accurate definition of these categories is crucial to the creditor
holding a security interest in goods that may or may not be fixtures.
The perfection requirements are different for each class of property,8
and only proper perfection protects a security interest against the
debtor's other creditors. Failure to perfect may result in loss of the
security interest 9 and a reduction in status to that of general creditor,
an unacceptable risk to one willing to furnish goods or credit only on
a secured basis.10
I
THE LAw OF THIs STATE ...
In relying on the law of each state for the definition of "fixture,"
the Code abandons the uniformity it establishes in other aspects of
chattel financing.11 This would create relatively minor inconveniences
if each state had a workable fixture definition, but there is no uniform-
ity among the states, and the cases within a given state are often in
irreconcilable conflict. In many states, whether a good has become a
fixture is decided under the "intention test" of Teaff v. Hewitt.12 Al-
though it purports to ascertain the intent of the one affixing goods to
7 Id.
8 No UCC security interest in real estate is possible, and the creditor must look to
his state's real property law to obtain a mortgage or materialman's or mechanic's lien.
The Code provides different filing requirements for fixtures (§ 9-401(1)(b)) and chattels
(§ 9-401(1)(c)).
9 For a demonstration of the worthlessness of improper filing against a trustee in
bankruptcy, see In re Babcock Box Co., 200 F. Supp. 80 (D. Mass. 1961); In re Luckenbill,
156 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
10 The recent growth of interstate credit through large metropolitan banks and
nationwide credit systems is an additional reason for a clear and uniform definition of
"fixture." Forcing such lenders to rely on the non-uniform fixture law of the several states,
especially when fixture law is often unsettled within a state, may hamper interstate credit
transactions.
11 The Code's primary objectives are "to simplify, clarify and modernize the law
governing commercial transactions" (UCC § 1-102(2)(a)) and "to make uniform the law
among the various jurisdictions" (UCC § 1-102(2)(c)).
12 1 Ohio St. 511, 59 Am. Dec. 634 (1853). The court stated the "intention test" in this
manner:
[T]he united application of the following requisites will be found the safest
criterion of a fixture.
1st. Actual annexation to the realty, or something appurtenant thereto.
2d. Appropriation to the use or purpose of that part of the realty with which
it is connected.
3d. The intention of the party making the annexation, to make the article a
permanent accession to the freehold-this intention being inferred from the nature
of the article affixed, the relation and situation of the party making the an-
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real estate, the Teaff test is really objective. The outcome depends
primarily on a jury's unguided weighing of a number of facts in an
effort to determine an ordinary person's expectations in the circum-
stances, and the results are inconsistent and unpredictable. 13
A more basic problem is that a number of states do not use the
term "fixture" in the Code sense. In these states only two types of prop-
erty, realty and personalty, are recognized; the tripartite division of
property contemplated by section 9-313 is completely unfamiliar. 4
"Fixture" is used, not to describe a special class of property attached to
the real estate but severable under proper circumstances, but to express
the legal conclusion that the goods have become a non-removable part
of the realty.15
nexation, the structure and mode of annexation, and the purpose or use for which
the annexation has been made.
Id. at 529-30, 59 Am. Dec. at 644-45 (emphasis in original).
Teaff has been referred to as "the leading American case on the law of fixtures." 75
HAvARD at 1344.
13 See 5 AwmCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 19.3, at 17 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
14 In Massachusetts a legislative attempt to create a tripartite system was foiled by
the courts. Under Clary v. Owen, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 522 (1860), all property added to
real estate after a mortgagee acquired his interest inured to the mortgagee. The harshness
of the Clary rule led some courts to find for the conditional seller by holding that the
goods had never become fixtures, and "in time Massachusetts law became notable for the
extraordinary subtlety of the distinction between fixtures and personalty." Gilmore, supra
note 2, at 1357. The legislature attempted to inject some order into the area by allowing
conditional sales of certain goods even if they were to be "wrought into or attached" to
real estate. Ch. 271, [1912] Mass. Acts & Resolves 183. This statute was crippled by judicial
narrowing of the class of goods to which it applied and by holdings that it did not
protect against prior real estate interests. Coogan at 1209. Conditional vendors therefore
continued to rely on findings of fact that goods remained personalty. Id. at 1210.
15 "A removable fixture as a term of general application, is a solecism-a contradic-
tion in words." Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 524, 59 Am. Dec. 634, 640 (1853).
California, with only two categories of property, refused to enact § 9-313:
[CJourts attach the label "fixture" to an object when they have decided that the
owner of an interest in the land should prevail, and they attach the label "per-
sonalty" ... when they have decided that the owner of an interest in the object
apart from the land should prevail; and they may attach both labels to exactly
the same object in different circumstances ....
.. [W]hat the Code asks the judge to do is to decide in the abstract under
"existing law" whether an object is a "fixture," and the Code will then tell him
... [who] will prevail . - . . But under the only existing law that there is, an answer
to the first question answers the second also ....
It would probably be a great advance in the law if the law of fixtures could
be codified and separated into two distinct problems: A factual classification of
an object as a "fixture," ... and ... a statement of the legal results ... which
follow from such a classification. It is impossible, however, to do only half of this
job without making a greater mess than there was before. . . . T]his Section
would only "add to the confusion" of the California law of fixtures (which is not
unique in that regard).
CALIpORNA SENATE FACr FINDING COMM = ON THE JUDICIARY, SICrT PsoG. SS REPORT TO
THE LxEosLATuRx, Part I, The Uniform Commercial Code 578 (1959-61) (emphasis added .
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It is not clear how the non-Code law of these states can help courts
determine into which of the three classes of property established by the
Code an item falls. The policy reasons for labelling certain collateral as
either realty or personalty in a situation where there was no provision
for notice to real estate interests may no longer be valid under the Code
with its filing provisions. 16
Even in states that had the tripartite division of property contem-
plated by the Code, reference to the law of the state for a fixture def-
inition is confusing and inadequate. This category of states is best
typified by those jurisdictions that adopted the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act (UCSA).17 Section 7 of the UCSA, the model for section
9-313,:1 permitted removal of goods affixed to realty if there had been
a proper filing and if the goods could be severed "without material
injury to the freehold." Interpretations of this phrase varied, how-
ever, despite the drafters' assertion that it included only physical in-
jury, such as would be caused by the removal of structural materials.'
In Pennsylvania the "material injury" test was really one of economic,
rather than physical, injury. Pennsylvania courts resurrected the "in-
dustrial plant mortgage doctrine" of Voorhis v. Freeman: "[w]hether
fast or loose .. . all the machinery of a manufactory which is necessary
to constitute it, and without which it would not be a manufactory at
all, must pass for a part of the freehold."20 The doctrine was not limited
to "manufactories," but was eventually applied to a private house, an
office building, an apartment house, a restaurant, and a stone quarry.21
Similarly, New Jersey's "institutional test" adopted an economic defini-
tion of "material injury." Under it, there was material injury, and
hence irremovability, whenever removal of the goods would impair
the economic "integrity" of the enterprise, even though the severance
would cause no physical damage.2 2
16 The concern that courts have shown in regard to the notice issue is evident in a
case such as Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull Say. & Loan Co., 135 Ohio St. 48, 19 N.E.2d
273 (1939). In that case the court allowed a subsequent purchaser of the realty, who hap-
pened also to be a prior mortgagee, to prevail over the conditional vendor of a furnace.
However, the decision might have been different had there been a means by which the
furnace company could have filed its conditional sales contract in the real estate records.
See id. at 55-56, 19 N.E.2d at 276.
17 2 U.LA. 1-42 (1922). The UCSA was adopted in only 11 states. 2 U.L.A. 9 (Supp.
1967).
18 2 G. GiMoRE, SEcURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 801 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as GILMopR]; Kripke, supra note 2, at 46.
19 See 2A U.L.A. 98-99 (1924).
20 2 W. & S. 116, 119, 87 Am. Dec. 490, 493 (Pa. 1841).
21 Leary, Financing New Machinery for Mortgaged Pennsylvania Industrial Plants, 4
VI. L. REv. 498, 523 (1959).
22 Gilmore, supra note 2, at 1860. See also Coogan at 1218-19.
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It seems that section 9-313 has abolished these doctrines as they
apply to removability.23 The section eliminates the "without material
injury" phrasing; a fixture-secured party with the proper priority can
remove his collateral regardless of the injury to the real estate, pro-
vided that he is willing to reimburse the holder of any real estate
interest who is not the debtor for the cost of repairing any physical
damage caused by the removal. 4 Also, section 9-313 narrows the class
of irremovable goods to only those "incorporated into" a structure;
under the plant mortgage doctrine physical affixation of the goods was
irrelevant.25 Although New Jersey's test always required a minimum
of some physical affixation, the Code has abolished its economic test.
Fixture cases that have arisen under the Code demonstrate the
inadequacy of state fixture law. In United States v. Baptist Golden Age
Home 26 the court decided that carpeting was equipment but admitted
that it was "capable of being construed as a fixture."2 7 The court in
In re Park Corrugated Box Corp2 8 employed the pre-Code economic
injury29 and intention tests,30 despite the Code's emphasis on physical
attachment. One court employed other Code provisions to avoid having
to attempt to ascertain, through the use of confusing state law, the ap-
plicable definition of "fixture." In re Colliers1 held that an oil-fired
boiler and burner used in a dry-cleaning establishment was "equip-
ment" under section 9-109(2).32 Equating the term "equipment" with
"chattel," the referee in bankruptcy held that it should have been pro-
23 Pennsylvania: Gilmore, supra note 2, at 1397. New Jersey: id. at 1397.
24 UCC § 9-313(5).
25 Compare Vail v. Weaver, 132 Pa. 363, 19 A. 138 (1890) (an engine and electric
dynamo firmly affixed to prepared foundations in a factory building were personalty
because their purpose was to light an opera house across the street), with First Nat'l Bank
v. Reichneder, 371 Pa. 463, 476, 91 A.2d 277, 282 (1952) (dissenting opinion) (beer kegs
that constantly went in and out of the brewery were fixtures).
Arguably, § 9-313 uses physical affixation as the major determinant of when goods
becomes fixtures. See Coogan at 1190.
26 226 F. Supp. 892 (W.D. Ark. 1964).
27 Id. at 903. Since the conditional seller had failed to perfect his interest for either
equipment or a fixture, the decision is correct. But it is of little assistance in defining the
term "fixture."
28 249 F. Supp. 56 (D.N.J. 1966). The court held that a corrugated box manufacturing
machine weighing 45,000 pounds and bolted to the floor was not a fixture.
29 The court's "institutional doctrine" determined "whether the chattel is perma.
nently essential to the completeness of the structure or its use." Id. at 58.
30 The court's "traditional test" is simply a restatement of the intention test of Teaff
v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 59 Am. Dec. 634 (1853). See note 12 supra and 249 F. Supp. at 58.
Another Code case that used the "intention test" to determine what is a fixture is
In re Particle Reduction Corp., 5 UCC REP. Smv. 242 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (referee's opinion).
31 3 UCC RP. SEav. 1076 (E.D. Tenn. 1966) (referee's opinion).
32 "Goods are 'equipment' if they are used or bought for use primarily in business."
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-109(2) (1964) [UCC § 9-109(2)].
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perly filed as such in order to prevail against a trustee in bankruptcy,33
and that therefore the fixture filing was ineffective. 34
II
ALTERNATIVES TO A DEFINrrION
Some commentators believe that if the filing requirements are
changed, no definition of "fixture" will be needed. For example, Pro-
fessor Shanker suggests that a security interest in fixtures should be
considered perfected only when filings are made in both the chattel
records and the real estate records. 85 This is unsatisfactory for a num-
ber of reasons. First, in some states triple rather than double filings in
different places would be required; 36 such multiple filings can be time-
consuming and expensive. Second, even where a party has made mul-
tiple filings, a definition may still be necessary because section 9-313
requires reimbursement for any damage done to the realty in removing
a fixture, while there is no corresponding duty of reimbursement for
incidental damage done in removing a chattel covered by a security
agreement. "It is easy to imagine cases where the secured party, to
avoid the reimbursement requirement, can argue plausibly that the
goods are not fixtures, while the real estate encumbrancer can, with
equal plausibility, argue that they are." 37 Finally, Professor Shanker's
proposal is based on the specious assumption that everyone filing secu-
rity interests in goods that are not unmistakably chattels will file twice.
The first time a creditor with a security interest in questionable col-
lateral files only once, confident that the article is a chattel, and then
comes into conflict with a real estate encumbrancer or trustee in bank-
33 TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-401(l)(c) (1964), an adaption of the second alternative
subsection (I) to UCC § 9-401, required a filing in the office of the Secretary of State.
34 The decision may rest on a theory of estoppel, since the sales contract referred to
the boiler as "equipment" and "personal property." 3 UCC REP. Smv. at 1077. For an
example of the use of estoppel under similar circumstances, see Cain v. Country Club
Delicatessen of Saybrook, Inc., 25 Conn. Supp. 327, 338, 203 A.2d 441, 446 (1964).
35 See Shanker, supra note 2, at 796-97.
3 In states that have adopted the third alternative subsection (1) to UCO § 9-401, the
financing statement would have to be filed for a fixture in the office where a mortgage
on the real estate would be filed or recorded (UCC § 9-401(l)(b)) and filed for a chattel
in the office of the Secretary of State and in addition in the office of the county clerk if
the debtor has a place of business in only one county of the state, or if he has no place
of business in the state but resides in the state (UCC § 9-401(i)(c)).
There is, in addition to filing requirements, the requirement of § 9-402(1), which
provides that a financing statement covering fixtures must "contain a description of the
real estate concerned."
37 2 GiLmoRE at 824.
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ruptcy who claims that the collateral is a fixture, this solution is useless
-the court will have to determine whether the article is a fixture.
Professor Kripke, 8 with the concurrence of Professor Gilmore,39
suggests that a single filing in the chattel records should be sufficient to
protect all security interests in both chattels and fixtures against pur-
chasers of the collateral and personal creditors of the debtor. If the
fixture-secured party desires protection against persons interested in
the real estate, an additional filing or indexing into the real estate
records, called "real estate notification,"40 should be required. This
proposal is open to the same criticism as Professor Shanker's; if a
secured party files only once, confident that his collateral is a chattel,
and then comes into conflict with a real estate interest claiming that
it is a fixture, the court must still define "fixture." In addition, as
Professor Kripke notes,4 1 his proposal raises the question of whether a
filing that is good against the debtor's personal creditors but not against
real estate interests in the land to which the fixture is attached would
be good against the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy. He concedes that
an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act may be necessary-a proposal
that raises a host of entirely new considerations.
III
PROPOSED DEFINrIONS
An adequate solution to the fixture problem requires a clear and
workable definition of the term "fixture." The Article 9 Review Com-
mittee has proposed a revision of the fixture provisions of the UCC
that employs the definitional approach in its solution of the problem.42
The text of this proposal [hereinafter referred to as Revision] is set
forth in Appendix B.
In seeming to distinguish between the concept of a fixture under
the Code and under the other law of the state, section 1(a) of the Re-
vision makes a good start. The UCC is concerned with what is a fixture
only for the purpose of protecting security interests in goods that are
in some way attached to the realty; for the sake of clarity and uni-
formity, it should ignore confusing and inconsistent state law that was
formulated for other purposes and with other policy objectives in
mind.4 But in section l(b)(i), the Revision embraces what it seemingly
88 Kripke, supra note 2, at 57.
39 2 Gnioma at 820-21.
40 Kripke, supra note 2, at 60.
41 Id. at 58.
42 See note 2 supra.
43 See 75 H.ARvA at 1348.
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rejects in section 1(a). Instead of breaking with the confusion and un-
certainty that plagues present fixture law, the provision continues to
look to the law of each state.44
The sentence in section l(b)(i) relating to "readily removable"
machines and replacements of domestic appliances is unclear and is a
possible source of confusion. Nowhere in the section or in the com-
ments is the phrase defined. At best, courts will disagree as to when a
machine or appliance is "readily removable;" at worst, the phrase will
be treated as "without material injury" in section 7 of the UCSA was
treated by the Pennsylvania and New Jersey courts.45 In addition, there
seems to be no reason for limiting the provision relating to domestic
appliances to "replacements." Surely, whether a particular item is a
fixture or not should not depend upon whether it is an original or a
replacement.
Section l(b)(i) of the Revision expands the list of items that are
considered "ordinary building materials," and thus not fixtures, when
incorporated into a structure on the land. This expansion clarifies the
class of goods that, when so incorporated, becomes realty, but it remains
unclear whether incorporated building materials are the only types of
goods in which a UCC security interest cannot be maintained.
A definition better than the Revision's has been proposed by Mr.
Coogan 46 (the text is set forth in Appendix C). His proposal is a good
one because it defines each of the three classes of property contemplated
by section 9-313, but it can be improved by engrafting upon it certain
parts of the Revision. Such a combination results in the most effective
definition, and a suggested text is set forth in Appendix D.
Subsection l(a) of the suggested definition (hereinafter referred to
as Suggestion) is basically section l(a) of the Revision. This is one of
the strong points of the Revision which is lacking in the Coogan defini-
tion. It makes a clean and badly needed break with non-Code fixture
law by asserting that a "Code fixture" is a unique concept which neither
is affected by the real property law of a state nor affects that law any
more than is absolutely necessary.
44 The first sentence of § l(b)(i) is a verbose restatement of the same provision in the
1952 version of § 9-313(1), which read in pertinent part:
(1) When under other rules of law goods are so affixed or related to the realty
as to be a part thereof, a security interest in such goods which attaches before
they become part of the realty takes priority as to such goods over the claims of
all persons who have an interest in the realty ....
UCO § 9-313(1) (1952). The change from the 1952 phrasing to the word "fixture" in the
present § 9-313(1) was "primarily for clarification" (2 GILMoRE at 808) and did not make
any substantive change in the section. Now the provision has come full circle-returning
to what is essentially the 1952 wording for clarification.
45 See text accompanying notes 20 & 22 supra.
40 Coogan at 1226-27.
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Suggestion subsection l(b) sets forth the definition of "incor-
porated" goods, which become realty and in which a security interest
cannot be maintained. It strives for a concise statement of the ap-
plicable rule and precise definitions of the key terms so as to leave no
room for misunderstanding. It avoids the verbosity of subsection l(a)
of the Coogan proposal, which is really more a list of relevant factors
than a definition. Suggestion subsection (1)(b) is a more comprehensive
delineation of this category than is the Revision provision, even though
Suggestion subsection l(b)(i) is borrowed from Revision subsection
1(b) (ii).
Suggestion subsections l(c) and (d) are almost verbatim carryovers
of subsections l(b) and (c) of the Coogan definition. These provisions
are the strongest parts of Mr. Coogan's proposal, and it is in this area
that the Revision fails badly. They provide clear and workable defini-
tions of both the fixture and chattel categories, while the Revision
refers, as does present section 9-313, to "the law of this state other than
this Act." Only minor editorial changes, in the interests of clarity, have
been made in these subsections.
The suggested definition operates on two premises: (1) the best
way to formulate a workable definition of "fixture" is to define the two
non-fixture categories also; and (2) a definition of "fixture" should be
based on what a purchaser of the real estate would reasonably expect
to pass with his purchase unless he was notified otherwise. Because of
the tremendous variety of goods that can be attached to realty in a
myriad of ways, the definition necessarily includes negative as well as
positive terms and refers to the purpose of affixation as well as the
manner. The touchstone of the definition, however, is always the rea-
sonable expectations of the purchaser of the realty.47
Robert L. Magielnicki
47 Some examples may serve to demonstrate the approach of the definition. A central
air conditioning unit installed in a factory building would dearly be a fixture. It is dearly
neither "building materials" nor "incorporated" into the factory building as defined in
subsection (b). The unit is also excluded from subsection (c) because it is attached to the
building by pipes and ducts and not solely by a power source or for the purpose of re-
duing noise or vibration. Subsection (d) includes the unit because it is related to the
functioning of the building itself, as a factory, and not merely to the conduct of a par-
ticular activity therein. In addition, it falls within the designation of "plumbing, heating,
air conditioning, sprinkling systems and similar types of goods," also in subsection (d).
In contrast, a large power saw installed in the same building would not be a fixture.
It is related to the carrying on of a particular activity within the building (e.g., carpentry
work) rather than to the functioning of the building as a factory. In addition, as is clearly
covered by subsection (c), the saw is attached to the building either solely by a power
source (e.g., an electrical cord), or by additional fastenings intended only to reduce noise or
vibration or to hold the equipment in place.
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APPENDIX A
§ 9-313. Priority of Security Interests in Fixtures.
(1) The rules of this section do not apply to goods incorporated into
a structure in the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metal work
and the like and no security interest in them exists under this Article unless
the structure remains personal property under applicable law. The law of
this state other than this Act determines whether and when other goods be-
come fixtures. This Act does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon
fixtures or real estate pursuant to the law applicable to real estate.
(2) A security interest which attaches to goods before they become
fixtures takes priority as to the goods over the claims of all persons who have
an interest in the real estate except as stated in subsection (4).
(3) A security interest which attaches to goods after they become fix-
tures is valid against all persons subsequently acquiring interests in the real
estate except as stated in subsection (4) but is invalid against any person
with an interest in the real estate at the time the security interest attaches to
the goods who has not in writing consented to the security interest or dis-
claimed an interest in the goods as fixtures.
(4) The security interests described in subsections (2) and (3) do not
take priority over
(a) a subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in the real estate;
or
(b) a creditor with a lien on the real estate subsequently obtained by
judicial proceedings; or
(c) a creditor with a prior encumbrance of record on the real estate to
the extent that he makes subsequent advances
if the subsequent purchase is made, the lien by judicial proceedings is ob-
tained, or the subsequent advance under the prior encumbrance is made or
contracted for without knowledge of the security interest and before it is
perfected. A purchaser of the real estate at a foreclosure sale other than an
encumbrancer purchasing at his own foreclosure sale is a subsequent pur-
chaser within this section.
(5) When under subsections (2) or (3) and (4) a secured party has
priority over the claims of all persons who have interests in the real estate,
he may, on default, subject to the provisions of Part 5, remove his collateral
from the real estate but he must reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of
the real estate who is not the debtor and who has not otherwise agreed for
the cost of repair of any physical injury, but not for any diminution in
value of the real estate caused by the absence of the goods removed or by
any necessity for replacing them. A person entitled to reimbursement may
refuse permission to remove until the secured party gives adequate security
for the performance of this obligation.
APPENDIX B
The Article 9 Review Committee's proposed revision creates this delin-
eation:
§ 9-313. Priority of Security Interests in Fixtures.
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l(a) This governs the priority between a security interest in goods,
including fixtures, and a real estate interest in the goods. The
declaration in this section that certain goods are not fixtures is
only for the purpose of the priority rules stated in this section, and
does not determine whether an interest in the goods passes under
a conveyance or mortgage of the real estate or whether the goods
are part of real estate under the law of this state other than this
Act.
(b) For the purpose of this section and the provisions in Part 4 of
this Article referring to' fixture filing, the following definitions
apply:
(i) Goods are "fixtures" when they are so related to particular
real estate that under the law of this state other than this Act
an interest in the goods would pass as part of the real estate
under a conveyance or mortgage thereof without specific men-
tion of the goods, except as stated in this paragraph. Where
ordinary building materials are incorporated in an improve-
ment upon land, which improvement is itself not a fixture,
the materials are real estate and not a fixture. An improve-
ment upon land is not a fixture unless it is readily removable
from the land. Readily removable factory and office machines
and readily removable replacements of domestic appliances
are not fixtures. Where the debtor is a tenant, goods which
he has a right to remove are not fixtures but are personal
property. Standing timber and growing crops and oil, gas
and minerals before severance are not fixtures.
(ii) The term "ordinary building materials" includes lumber,
millwork, brick, tile, siding, roofing, cement, glass, wiring,
piping and structural members, other than readily removable
items of special value such as ornamental metal work, orna-
mental mantels and carved panelling.
APPENDIX C
Mr. Coogan's proposal takes the following form:
§ 9-313. Security Interests in Fixtures.
(1) The following rules govern the application of this Article to goods
associated with particular real estate.
(a) Neither the fixture rules nor any other rules of this Article shall
apply to goods after they have become building materials, and no
security interest in them can thereafter exist under this Article.
Fixture rules include those of this section 9-313 and the fixture
rules of Part 4 of this Article.
The term building materials includes goods that have become
so incorporated or built into a building that their removal there-
from would necessarily involve the removal or destruction of some
part of the building and thereby cause substantial damage to the
building apart from the value of the goods removed, but the term
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does not include goods that are severable from the land merely by
unscrewing, unbolting, unclamping or uncoupling, or some other
method of disconnection, and does not include equipment or
consumer goods installed in a building for use in the carrying on
of an industry or activity where the only substantial damage, apart
from the value of the equipment or consumer goods removed, that
would necessarily be caused to the building in removing the equip-
ment or consumer goods therefrom is that arising from the removal
or destruction of the bed or casting on or in which the item is set
and the making or enlargement of an opening in the walls of the
building sufficient for the removal from the building. Building in-
cludes a structure, erection, or mine, erected or constructed on or
in land.
This Act does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon
fixtures or real estate pursuant to the law applicable to real estate,
but the priorities established by this section shall control where
applicable.
(b) The fixture rules do not apply to any collateral other than equip-
ment or consumer goods, nor to equipment or consumer goods not
physically affixed to the realty, nor to such goods physically at-
tached only by electrical cords or temporary water connections,
nor do they apply to equipment physically attached only for a
purpose such as reducing noise or vibration, or holding the equip-
ment in place. Security interests in such collateral are covered by
sections of Article 9 other than the fixture rules.
(c) The fixture provisions of this Article apply to equipment and con-
sumer goods which relate to the functioning of the building, for
whatever purpose it may be used (as distinguished from the func-
tioning of particular activities conducted therein), including goods
used for plumbing, heating, air conditioning, refrigeration, sprin-
kling systems and other equipment and consumer goods which are
customarily physically affixed to the real estate, not including build-
ing materials referred to in subdivision (a) nor goods attached only
for the purpose set forth in subdivision (b). Notwithstanding the
provision of paragraphs (a) and (b), such fixture rules apply to
portable buildings other than those required to be registered or
licensed in connection with motor vehicle laws.
APPENDIX D
The synthesis suggested by this note as the most effective definition is:
§ 9-313. Security Interests in Fixtures,
(1)(a) This section governs the priority between a security interest in
goods attached to real estate, and a real estate interest in such
goods. The declaration in this section that certain goods are
not fixtures is only for the purposes of this Act and of the pri-
ority rules stated in this section, and does not determine whether
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an interest in the goods passes under a conveyance or mortgage
of the real estate or whether the goods are part of real estate
under the law of this state other than this Act. Nor does this
Act prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures or real
estate pursuant to the law applicable to real estate, but the pri-
orities established by this section shall control where applicable.
(b) Neither the rules of this section nor any other rules of this
Article shall apply to building materials which have been in-
corporated into a building, and no security interest in them
can thereafter exist under this Article. Such goods are the only
class of goods in which a security interest under this Article
cannot exist.
(i) The term "building materials" refers to goods on the
order of -lumber, millwork, brick, tile, siding, roofing, cement,
glass, wiring, piping, and structural members.
(ii) The term "incorporated" means built into a building in
such a way that the removal of the building materials would
necessarily involve the destruction or removal of some part of
the building itself. It does not include goods which are severable
merely by unscrewing, unbolting, unclamping, uncoupling, or
a similar method of disconnection.
(iii) The term "building" includes a structure, erection, or mine,
erected or constructed on or in land.
(c) The rules of this section do not apply to any collateral other
than equipment or consumer goods, nor to such equipment or
consumer goods not physically attached to the realty, nor to
such goods which are physically attached solely by electrical
cords or any other power source, or temporary water connec-
tions. Nor do the rules of this section apply to equipment which
is physically attached for a purpose such as reducing noise or
vibration or holding the equipment in place; nor to goods which
relate not to the functioning of the building itself, but to the
conduct of particular activities therein. Such collateral are not
fixtures, and security interests in them are covered by other
sections of this Article.
(d) The rules of this section apply to equipment and consumer
goods which relate to the functioning of the building itself, for
whatever purpose it may be used (as distinguished from the con-
duct of particular activities therein), including goods used for
plumbing, heating, air conditioning, sprinkling systems and
similar types of goods which are customarily physically attached
to the real estate, not including the building materials referred
to in subdivision (b) nor goods attached solely for the purpose
referred to in subdivision (c). Notwithstanding subdivisions (b)
and (c), the rules apply to portable buildings other than those
governed by motor vehicle laws.

